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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
TRANSACTIONS IN AID OF EDUCATION
By
JOHN C. CHOM.MIE*

PART III**
The Payment: Is It A Business Expense?
The problems in the two previous parts of this study concerned the federal
income tax consequences of transactions involving the aid of others than the payor.1 7 9 The central theme in this, the third part, might be said to consist of self aid.
The motives of the payor here concern his own interests in some manner. A slightly
different approach might be taken. The payments dealt with in this part are ordinarily considerational, whereas the previous discussion dealt with payments donative in character. These differences, it will be seen, have bred totally different
legal criteria and a stricter judicial approach bearing on the question of tax benefit to the payor.
Congress has expressly furnished the basic criteria for two of the competing
concepts of the problems here involved and implicitly provided for the third. Section 23(a) (1) (A) of the Code allows the taxpayer as a deduction from gross
income for:
"All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit
of a trade or business .... '
On the other hand, Congress has provided in section 23 (a) (1) that "in computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of personal,
living or family expenses, except extraordinary medical expenses deductible under
section 23 (x) ."
The third concept would seem to have its roots in the distinction drawn between income and capital. It is assumed that an expenditure that is characterized
as capital is not to be also characterized as a business expense.1 8 0
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.S.L., LL.B., St. Paul College of Law; LL.M.,
University of Southern California; member of the Minnesota Bar.
**
(Editor's Note: Part's III, IV, and V herein constitute the final installment of a series begun
in the January issue of the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW, the second installment appearing in the

March issue.)
170 Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education", 58 DICKINSON
LAW REVIEW 93 (January, 1954), discussing prizes, awards, fellowships and scholarships as taxable income; ibid., 58 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 189 (March, 1954), discussing deductibility
of contributions to educational organizations.
180 Cf., I.R.C. § 23(1) and § 24(a)(3).
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A third Code provision might seem to bear upon the problems here involved.
Section 23 (a) (2), under the heading of "Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses",
allows a deduction:
"In the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or
collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income."
This provision was congressional reaction to Supreme Court characterization
of an investor's activities as not being embraced within the term "trade or businss".18 1 It does not seem, however, to be directly involved in the judicial develop82
ment of the problems here involved.1
In short, the competing concepts involved are personal and capital expenditures, on the one hand, which are not deductible and business expenditures, on
the other hand, which are deductible in computing net income.
The observation has often been made by the courts that deductions are matters
of legislative grace. This is a questionable approach to statutory construction. However, generally, the taxpayer has the burden of proof to bring himself within the
statute. Thus, the taxpayer claiming a deduction for an educational expenditure
must show: (1) that it was an "ordinary and necessary" expense; (2) that it was
paid or incurred during the taxable year; and (3) that it was incurred in the
carrying on of a "trade or business".
Individuals
The individual most likely to be making an educational expenditure reasonably related to his trade or business would be a professional person. The case law
bears this out. Almost without exception the problems here involved are the
problems of the professional person. Therefore, it is with the lawyer, the teacher,
the doctor and the like that we are here concerned.
From the standpoint of the three basic Code requirements, the case law does
not reveal much conflict with the second and third requirements. The term "trade
or business" has been given such a sufficiently broad interpretation, that few professional taxpayers have experienced difficulty here. In other words, a professional,
whether self-employed or an employee, is usually treated for tax purposes as being engaged in a "trade or business". 1 8 The broad issue is ordinarily whether
181 Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 475 (1941).
182 Mrs. Winthrop Rockefeller may have such a problem in connection with the preservation of
her estate. "In the evenings, when she does not have guests, she reads about trusts and finance
and tax laws, just as she has always boned up on anything that provoked her interest. 'Personal
Estate Planning in a Changing World' by Rene Wormser is one of her current texts." Bergquist,
"'Bobo As Seen by Her Oldest Friend", 36 Life No. 11, p. 106 at 122 (March 15, 1954). Presumably her expenditures for these educational pursuits would be deductible under § 23(a)(2).
Perhaps also would be her expenses in attending the New York University Tax Institute. See Coughlin v. Commissioner, n. 221, infra. Cf., reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(f), infra. n. 186.

188

See e.g. Hill v. Commissioner, infra n. 211; I.T.2481, VIII-2 C.B. 292 (1929).
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or "ordinary and necessary" exthe particular expenditure is a personal, capital
84
activity.'
professional
taxpayer's
the
pense of
The Capital Concept. It now seems to be conceded that expenses
incurred in "laying a foundation for the future" are in the nature of capital expenditures and that expenses incurred in obtaining formal training unrelated to
an existing trade or business fall into this category. However, the courts have not
always been consistent in classifying such expenditures. For example, in T. F.
Driscoll,'8 5 an early Board case, the taxpayer, in anticipation of a singing career,
incurred lesson and travel expense. The Board simply found that such expense
"at th'e time made was for educational purposes and of a personal character".
Drawing a distinction between personal and capital expenses is often immaterial
because in neither event is a deduction allowable. Clarification, however, it will
86
be seen, would aid considerably in the solution of many of the problems.'
A convenient starting point as regards the basic nature of formal educational
187
expenditures is a dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Welch v. Helvering. In
the case, the taxpayer was a grain commission agent. He had been associated with
a corporate bankrupt. In order to reestablish his customer relations and solidify
his credit, he paid some of the discharged corporate debts. Thes'e amounts he
claimed as business expenses. In upholding a denial of the deduction by the Board
of Tax Appeals and the circuit court, Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"We may assume that the payments. . .were necessary for the development of the petitioner's business, at least in the sense that they
were appropriate and helpful. . . .But the problem is not solved when
the payments are characterized as necessary. Many necessary payments
are charges upon capital. There is need to determine whether they are
both necessary and ordinary. Now, what is ordinary, though there must
be always a strain of constancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by time and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this context does
not mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that
the taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be
so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense is an
ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for such
184 The Second Circuit in Coughlin v. Commissioner, discussed infra n. 221, involving the claim
of a lawyer that his expenses in attending a tax institute were business expenses, and expressed it
thusly, "The expenses were deductible under section 23(a) (1) (A) if they were 'directly connected with' or 'proximately resulted from' the practice of his profession. Kornhauser v. United
States, 276 U.S. 145, 48 S.Ct. 219,220, 72 L.Ed. 505. And if it were usual for lawyers in prac-

tice similar to his to incur such expenses they were 'ordinary'. Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S.
488,495, 60 S.Ct.363, 84 L.Ed.416. They were also 'necessary' if appropriate and helpful. Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 S.Ct. 8, 78 L.Ed. 212." 203 F.2d 307, 308-09. The three cited cases

are considered the landmark cases in this area.
185 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926).
186 The precise statutory approach is perhaps § 23(a)(2), the non-trade or non-business provision. This perhaps accounts for the view of the Treasury expressed in § 39.23(a)-15 of the regulations that "expenses of taking special courses or training ... and expenses such as expenses in
seeking employment or placing oneself in position to begin rendering personal services for compensation" are not deductible under § 23(a) (2).
187 290 U.S. 111, 54 S.Ct. 8 (1933).
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a purpose. . .are the common and accepted means of defense against
attack."
". . .the situation is unique in the life of the individual affected,
but not in the life of the group .. "
"One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a
ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law;
it is rather a way, of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer
to the riddle....
"One man has a family name that is clouded by thefts committed by
an ancestor. To add to his own standing he repays the stolen money, wiping off, it may be, his income for the year. . . .Another man conceives
the notion that he will be able to practice his vocation with greater ease
and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich his culture. Forthwith the
price of his education becomes an expense of his business, reducing the
income subject to taxation. There is little difference between these expenses and those in controversy here. Reputation and learning are akin
to capital assets, like the goodwill of an old partnership. . . .For many
they are the only tools with which to hew a pathway to success. The
money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a business." 188 (citations omitted)
This dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo has been frequently echoed in the lower
courts. A case in point is James M. Osborn.189 Here, the taxpayer was a nonsalaried Yale University professor. In 1940, he expended some $7,000 on literary
research in producing three books. One book was distributed free; another was
published at the taxpayer's expense in a limited edition; and the third, unpublished, was expected to show a profit. However, the taxpayer testified that his
purpose or motive in writing was to establish a scholarly reputation in order to
increase his possibilities of obtaining a highly paid position in education.
The Tax Court denied the deduction. It pointed out that the taxpayer's work
on his books was his principal occupation but that he was not engaged in writing
primarily for profit. It was said that apparently his entire interest was "in laying
a foundation for the future. His position was similar to that of any student preparing and training himself for a profession or lifework. . . .The expenses incurred in preparing himself are in essence the cost of a capital structure from
which his future income is to be derived." 1 90
As stated above, the Treasury persists in using the term "personal" in characterizing educational expenses. With regard to preparatory educational expenses,
here under discussion, it would seem that logically they could be classified under
two headings: (1) personal-capital, and (2) personal-current. The first group
might embrace tuition and other expenses in the acquisition of knowledge, and the
second group, analogous to current business expenses, might embrace such items
188
189
190

Ibid., 290 U.S. 113-116, 54 S.Ct. at 9-10.
3 T.C. 603 (1944).
Ibid., 3 T.C. at 605.
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as meals and lodging. Of course, at times a choice would have to be more or less
arbitrary 19 1.
Some "Ordinary and Necessary" Expenses of Professional People. Once a
trainee is established in a profession section 23(a) (1) (A) is available. However, if a taxpayer's status is that of an employee, he is somewhat restricted simply
because as an employee he has but few "ordinary and necessary" expenses.
In this area, there have been a number of rulings and decisions. However,
the following listing is intended as but illustrative to point up the discussion in
the following section dealing with the additional formal training of professional
people.
(1) Dues: The current regulations and a long continued administrative practice recognizes dues paid to professional societies and similar organizations as allowable business expenses.' 9 2 The cases and the rulings do not reveal a conflict
as regards such items.
(2) Cost of publications: The regulations allow a professional person to deduct the costs of subscriptions of professional journals and amounts currently expended for books "the useful life of which is short".' 93 On the other hand, the
Income Tax Unit has ruled that while teachers can deduct "the price of their
subscriptions for educational journals connected with their profession", the "cost
of technical books is a capital expenditure", and may be subject to a depreciation deduction.' 9 4 Perhaps there is no intent to make a distinction here, in other
words, that the costs of technical books "the useful life of which is short" would
presumably be likewise allowed, and by necessary inference the professional man
would be required to capitalize the cost of books of a longer useful life. This
seems to be the standard administrative practice.
(3) Professional conventions: The Service fought a ten year losing fight
with regard to costs of travel, meals and lodging in attending professional conventions and societies. In an early ruling, it was held that amounts expended by
a physician in attending a medical convention were not deductible. 19 5 However,
after a series of reversals before the Board of Tax Appeals involving a variety of
191 Not all preliminary expenses incurred in preparing for the production of income have been
treated as personal or capital. E.g., the Service has long allowed fees paid in securing employment
as business expense. O.D.579, 3 C.B. 130 (1920). It is arguable that such an item is a capital
expenditure amortizable over the term of the employment secured. However, perhaps in the interests of administrative convenience and the proximity to the actual production of income, a deduction is justified.
192 Reg.118, § 39.23(a)-5 (dues of professional person paid to professional societies); O.D.
450, 2 C.B. 105 (1920) (union dues); I.T.3448, 1941-1 C.B. 206 (teacher's dues to professional
societies); accord: Henry D. Kieth, f 42,630, P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec. (judge's bar association dues).
52,055, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., allowing a salesman a de198 Ibid. See also Irving L. Shein,
duction for the cost of a marketing service publication as an ordinary and necessary expense in
carrying on his selling activities.
194 I.T.3448, 1941-1 C.B. 206.
C.B. 123 (1922), revoked by I.T.?602, X-2 C.B. 130 (1931).
195 I.T. 1369, I.-I
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professional types, 196 this ruling was revoked. 197 These items now constitute
recognized business expenses for all types of professional taxpayers including
teacher-employees.19
In one unusual set of circumstances, the Commissioner did salvage a victory.
9 9 the taxpayer, a lawyer, was allowed a deduction for
In Ellis v. Commissioner,1
his expenses in attending an American Bar Association convention, but was denied the costs of a trip to Europe as a member of an association committee studying criminal procedure and law enforcement. The court of appeals said that the
trip had "no tendency to increase his professional income, which is apparently
contemplated by the statute, unless we consider the too remote effect on his professional prestige of such recognition and activity". The Board of Tax Appeals
using similar language had also said that "the purpose of the trip. . .was not to
serve or educate himself but to secure information for the Bar Association".
(4) Research expenses: In this category, and in the others following, the
effect of the taxpayer's status as an employee is noticeable. For example, the research expenses of a practicing attorney in connection with the preparation of a
lawsuit would clearly be considered ordinary and necessary in his business. With
the teacher-employee, however, it is different. An early administrative view was
that a college teacher's research, while urged by his college and effecting his professional recognition, was a personal matter in as much as it did not effect the
salary he received. 20 0 This extreme view, however, was later modified by G.C.M.
11654.201 This ruling deals with the research work of a college teacher for which
he receives no remuneration. It holds that depreciation on books and instruments
used in research and travelling expenses to attend meetings of scientific societies
are deductible. It also states that whether expenditures in connection with the
publication of the results of investigation, such as plates and figures for illustrative
purposes, are deductible will depend upon whether such expenses are ordinary
and necessary or constitute capital expenditures. This latter holding is not too
dear, but it does seem to constitute a major concession as regards research in general, recognizing such activity as a legitimate part of the teacher's trade or business.
However, where the motive or purpose of the teacher in connection with his research is the acquisition of an academic degree, the Commissioner still adheres
196 Marion D. Shutter, 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925), acq., IV-2 C.B.4 (1925) (minister); Alexander
Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), acq., VI-2 C.B. 6 (1927) (college professor) ; Cecil M. Jack,
13 B.T.A. 726 (1928), acq., VIII-2 C.B. 26 (1929) (physician), distinguishing Everett L. Lain,
3 B.T.A. 1157 (1926), where a deficiency was upheld for want of proof; J. Bentley Squier, 13
B.T.A. 1223 (1928), acq., VIII-2 C.B. 49 (1929) (physician) ; Wade H. Ellis, 15 B.T.A. 1075
(1929), affm'd., 50 F.2d 343 (C.A.D.C. 1931) (lawyer); Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242
(1931), acq., X-2 C.B. 14 (1931) (physician). All of these involved other issues.
197 I.T. 2602, X-2 C.B. 130 (1931).
198 I.T. 3448, 1941-1 C.B. 206.
199 50 F.2d 343 (C.A.D.C. 1931).
200 I.T.1520, 1-2 C.B. 145 (1922), revoked in so far as such expenditures are characterized as
personal by I.T. 2688, XII-1 C.B. 251 (1933).
201 X1I-1 C.B. 250 (1933).
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to the position that expenditures in connection therewith are personal. This view
20 2
has recently been upheld by the Tax Court in Richard Henry Lampkin.
(5) Traveling: In addition to allowance of traveling expenses in connection
with attendance upon conventions and societies discussed above, the Service has
ruled on several other travel expense situations. In I.T. 2481,208 such expenses incurred by a university professor spending fifty-six days on an out of town tutoring
assignment were allowed in full. Similarly, traveling expenses to a summer assignment have been allowed. 2 04 Also, traveling expenses incurred while on sabbatical leave where the taxpayer was required to report and was limited in the
scope of his travels, have been allowed.2 05 On the other hand, where the purpose
of a summer trip to Europe was simply to 'enrich a taxpayer-professor's cultural
background, his expenses were held by the Tax Court to be personal and expressiy excluded by section 24(a) (1).206
(6) Other expenses: The regulations allow a professional person, who is selfemployed, deductions for the cost of supplies, expenses and repairs in the use of
an automobile used in making professional calls, office rent, the cost of utilities
and the hire of assistants.2 07 Contrasted are the limitations on an employee. In
Chester C. Hand, Sr., 208 the taxpayer was an employed teacher. He claimed deductions for depreciation on his car, expenses for its upkeep, a portion of his apartment rent, telephone expenses and other items. The court denied all deduction
claims. The taxpayer was an employee, and these items did not constitute trade
or business expenses nor were the car expenses to be treated as travel expenses as
they were merely commuting costs.
The Service, however, has allowed a teacher-employee a deduction for the
cost of paying a substitute on a per diem basis as an ordinary and necessary busi209
ness expense.
Additional Formal Training.The costs of additional formal training of a professional person command separate treatment. Here, the conflict between the personal and capital concepts on the one hand with the business expense concept on
the other is most acute.
52,173 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec.
202
203 VIII-2 C.B. 292 (1929).
204 G.C.M.10915, XI-2 C.B. 245 (1932), relating to railroad fare only but presumably appl;cable to meals and lodging as the ruling relies upon and follows l.T.2481, ibid. G.C.M.10915
was a reversal of a previous contrary view, I.T. 1238, 1-1 C.B.122 (1922), revoked by I.T.2640,
XI-2 C.B. 246 (1932).
205 I.T.3380, 1940-1 C.B. 29.
206 Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951).
207 Reg.118, § 39.23(a)-5. For a unique, but unsuccessful, effort by a lawyer at splitting income
via § 23(a)(1) by making payments to his son for the latter's legal education in return for his
future services, see George F. Lewis, 8 T.C. 770 (1947), affm'd. per cur., 164 F.2d 885 (C.C.A.2d
1947).
208 16 T.C. 1410 (1951).
209 I.T.2973, XV-1 C.B. 89 (1936).
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The Service, from an early date, has maintained that formal educational costs
are personal. 210 This position it managed to maintain intact up to 1950, when
school teacher Nora Hill opened a wedge in the 'Commissioner's line in Hill v.
211
Commissioner.
In the Hill case, the taxpayer was a public high school English teacher. She
was notified that her certificate would not be renewed unless she complied with
regulations (state law) requiring either: (1) securing of college credits, or (2)
an examination on five selected books. The taxpayer elected to attend Columbia
University during a summer session. She enrolled in two courses, short-story writing and abnormal psychology. She claimed as a deduction her transportation expenses and a difference between what her board cost her in New York and what
it would have cost in Virginia. The Tax Court denied the deduction. 212 The rationale was that the taxpayer had not satisfied the term "ordinary" in that she did
not show that the method she pursued was the "usual method followed" in obtaining certificate renewals, and there was no evidence that the taxpayer was to be
retained in her employment.
The Fourth Circuit reversed. It stated that requiring a statistical showing as
regards the method following was unreasonable and had not been followed in
other cases. It said that it was sufficient to show "a response that a reasonable
person would normally and naturally make under the specific circumstances". It
pointed out that the taxpayer had not resigned and that she undertook the summer training "to maintain her position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to
carry on, not to commence" and that therefore the Treasury position that summer
school expenses are personal was not applicable where, as here, the training is
"essentially to enable a teacher to continue her (or his) career in her (or his) exist2 18
ing position".
The Hill decision seems to have had two major effects: (1) it has caused
the Treasury to review its traditional position that all additional training costs are
personal expenses; and (2) it has encouraged a number of other professional
people, particularly school teachers, to attempt to broaden the narrow rule laid
down in the case.
In I.T.4044, 214 the Service reconsiders O.D.892, 215 holding summer school
expenses of teachers to constitute personal expenses, in light of the Hill decision.
210 O.D.892; 4 C.B. 209 (1921), denying deductions for a teacher's summer school expenses;
O.D.984, 5 C.B. 171 (1921), denying deduction for a doctor's post-graduate course. Cf., John
47,183, P-H T.C. Memo.
Charles Thomas, f 39,112, P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec.; Frieda Hempel,
Dec., both allowing professional singers deductions for costs of professional singing coaches.
211 181 F.2d 906 (C.A.4th 1950), note, 1951 Wis.L.Rev. 366. See also Bowen, "Teachers and
Taxes", 32 Taxes 57 (1954).
212 Nora Payne Hill, 13 T.C. 291 (1949).
213 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d at 909. The court also felt that the Thomas and Hempel
cases, supra o.210, where professional singers were allowed deductions for expenses of singing
coaches, were highly persuasive, and it also quoted with approval from Professor Maquire's critique

of the Tax Court decision in "Federal Income Taxation in 1950", 35 Am. Assn. of Uni. Professor's Bull. 748.
214
215

1951-1 C.B. 16.
4 C.B. 209 (1921), supra n.210.
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I.T.4044 is limited in application to public school teachers. In analyzing the Hill
decision, the ruling states:
"In reaching its conclusion, the Court stressed the fact that the taxpayer incurred the expenses 'to maintain her position' . . .Thus, it is
apparent that the Court did not hold that all teachers att'ending summer
school may deduct their expenses as "ordinary and necessary business
expenses." In cases in which the facts are similar to those present in the
Hill case, the rule of that case will be applied.. ."
"In general, summer school expenses. . .for the purpose of maintaining her position are deductible under section 23(a) (1)(A) .but
expenses .. .for the purpose of obtaining a teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a higher position, an advance in the salary
schedule, or to fulfill the cultural aspirations of the teachers. . .are
personal."
This ruling certainly can not be said to expand on the precise rule of the Hill
case. It does have some virtue in outlining broadly a number of areas where the
Service will continue to litigate. It also raises a number of questions, particularly
as regards the meaning of "qualifying for permanent status", and the effect on
2 16
It does not
rrivate school teachers required to have certificates under state law.
seem to offer much hope for the teacher in the private school or in the college or
university where certification is not required.
The second effect of the Hill decision has been to engender some taxpayer
boldness. Perhaps the extreme is illustrated by Chester C. Hand Sr., 2 17 discussed
above, where a teacher-employee was denied deductions for depreciation on his
automobile, its upkeep expense, a portion of his apartment rent, telephone expense and other items. In addition to the Hand case, the Tax Court has distinguished the Hill case in denying deductions for expenses in connection with additional formal training where the primary purpose of the taxpayer was the
achievement of an academic degree. 218 In Manoel Cardozo,2 19 discussed above, in
denying the costs of a summer European trip to a college professor, the Tax Court
commented that whether it followed the court of appeal's decision in the Hill case
where the maintenance of position was stressed or its own opinion in the same
case the Commissioner must prevail. In a recent decision, however, the Tax Court
has indicated that it will follow the Fourth Circuit decision. In Rhoda Fennell,220
the taxpayer, a librarian, was allowed a deduction for expenses incurred in taking
216 See discussion in Johnson, "Deducting Summer School Expenses", 29 Taxes 749 (1951).
Professor Johnson also suggests that boards of education might use the compulsive features of the
ruling and the Hill case as a device to raise teaching standards.
217 16 T.C. 1410 (1951), cited supra n.208. In all fairness it should be noted that the taxpayer
was a non-practicing C.P.A. and perhaps felt that his status would be treated as equivalent to that
of a practicing, self-employed, professional person where allowance of such deductions is standard
practice. Reg.118, § 39.23(a)-5.
"Is Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950) (industrial engineer, a candidate for a B.Adm.Eng. de52,173, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec., cite supra n.202
gree at night school) ; Richard Henry Lampkin,
(college professor, a candidate for a doctor's degree).
219' 17 T.C. 3 (1951), cited supra n.206.
220
53,156, P-H T.C. Memo. Dec.
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additional instruction in library science where the evidence established that the
courses were necessary to enable the taxpayer to maintain her position.
The latest development in this problem of advanced schooling of professional
people is the Second Circuit decision in Coughlln v. Commissioner.2 21 In this
case, the taxpayer, a lawyer, and his firm's tax man, expended money for travel,
tuition, board and lodging in attending a New York University Tax Institute. The
Institute was designed for lawyers, accountants and others conversant with taxation. Students were warned away. The Commissioner denied the claim for deduction on the basis of O.D.984,22 2 a 1921 ruling providing that expenses of postgraduate courses taken by doctors are personal expenses. The Tax Court upheld
the deficiency distinguishing the Hill decision as being limited to "the facts bLfore the Court", and concluded:
"The expenses incurred by the petitioner. . .are not deductible as
and
ordinary and necessary business expenses because of the2 educational
28
personal nature of the object pursued by the petitioner."
The Second Circuit reversed. Circuit Judge Chase noted "how dim a line is
drawn between expenses which are deductible because incurred in trade or business. . .and those which are non-deductible because personal". He rejected the
Commissioner's reliance on the regulations under section 23(a) (2) expressly precluding expenses of special courses or training 22 4 and commented thusly on the
Welch case:
"In Welch v. Helvering. .there is a dictum that the cost of acquiring learning is a personal expense. But the issue decided in that
case is far removed from the one involved here .... The general reference to the cost of education as a personal expense was made by way
of illustrating the point then under decision, and it related to that knowledge which is obtain'ed for its own sake as an addition to one's cultural
background or for possible use in some work which might be started in
the future. There was no indication that an exception is not to be made
acquired was needed for use in a lawyer's estabwhere the information
22 5
lished practice."
The opinion also pointed out that the expenses under consideration were
analogous to expenditures for dues to professional societies, costs of subscriptions to professional journals and book- whose useful life is short all of which
are allowable deductions under the regulations.22 6 He further said that the case
"is closely akin" to the Hill case, the only difference being "in the degree of necessity which prompted the incurrence of the expenses". The taxpayer here, it was
said, was "morally bound to keep so informed", and while the knowledge gained
221 203 F.2d 307 (C.A.2d 1953), noted: 3 Buff.L.Rev. 150 (1953); 5 Syr.L.Rev. 98 (1953);
102 U.ofPa.L.Rev. 138 (1953); 7 Vand.L.Rev. 134 (1953); 52 Mich.L.Rev, 459 (1954).
222

5 C.B. 171 (1921),

223
224
226
226

George G. Coughlin, 18 T.C. 528, 530 (1952).
Reg.118, § 39.23(a)-15, cited supra n.'s182,186.
Coughlin v.Commissioner, 203 F.2d at 309.
Reg.118, § 39.23(a)-5, cited supra n.'s 192,193,207.

cited supra n.210.
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may have increased his "fund of learning in general and, in that sense, the cost
of acquiring it may have been a personal expense. . .the immediate over-all professional need to incur the expenses in order to perform his work with due regard to the current status of the tax so overshadows the personal aspect that it is
the decisive feature".2 27 The opinion concluded:
"It (the professional need) serves also to distinguish these expenditures from those made to acquire a capital asset. Even if in its cultural
aspect knowledge should for tax purposes be considered in the nature of
a capital asset as was suggested in Welch v. Helvering. . .the rather
evanescent character of that for which the petitioner spent his 22money
8
deprives it of the sort of permanency such a concept embraces."
The rule of the case seems to be an extension of the Hill cage rule that the
moral obligation to keep conversant with current tax developments overshadows
"the personal aspect" as the "decisive feature". One can only wish that the court
had been more explicit in either acceptance or rejection of the capital expenditure
concept. In labeling tax knowledge as "'evanescent", the court was echoing some
fairly common sentiment, sentiment, however, that can hardly be taken seriously.
The decision in the Coughlin case raises a number of important questions.
Will the Treasury review O.D.984 as it did O.D.892 after the Hill decision?
Where stands the general practitioner handling only an occasional tax matter?
The doctor, the dentist, the teacher? Illustrations are hardly needed with regard
to the latter groups. All disciplines present knowledge of an "evanescent character" with regard to which there is a moral obligation to keep conversant.
Under the present developed case, at least four basic approaches are possible
to the problem of additional formal training of professional people. First, would
be an acceptance of the dictum in the Welch case as a basic principle that all expenses in the acquisition of knowledge by a formal type of training constitute
capital expenditures. This position would render moot any conflict between the
personal and business expense concepts, any determination as to whether the type
of knowledge was of an "evanescent character" and any question of determining
the taxpayer's purpose or motive. In short, its desirability would like in its simplicity and, perhaps, in the protection it would afford the revenue.
A second approach would be to reject completely the capital expenditure
idea in this area and approach all problems from the viewpoint of the personalbusiness expense conflict. It would seem that a sound argument could be made that
such an approach is more in accord with congressional intent and that if Congress
had intended to inject the capital expenditure concept into the personal-business
expense conflict, it would have expressly so provided. The desirability of such
an approach, however, is questionable. While it would have a clarifying effect
on analysis, it might invite a considerable amount of litigation.
227
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Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d at 309.
Ibid.
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A third approach would be a limited acceptance of the Welch dictum. For
example, as limited to preparatory training and additional training of a cultural
nature. Once this question is decided, the air would be clear for a determination
of whether the expense was personal or an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. This approach might be desirable from the standpoint of a conceptual tax
jurisprudence.
A fourth approach, and one which seems more in accord with current developments, would be the converse of the preceding one. In other words, a determination on the personal-business expense conflict, and then, if necessary, resolving
the question of whether the expenditure is current or capital in nature. This approach would likewise be desirable from the viewpoint of a conceptual tax jurisprudence. However, it suggests a number of problems. How are reliable criteria
to be established for distinguishing between the temporary and the more permanent type of learning? Would all expenditures be controlled by the basic characterization? However, this seems to be the present trend as suggested by the
Coughlin and perhaps the Hill opinions. If so, additional litigation and a restatement of the Treasury position would seem to be a reasonable anticipation.
Corporations
Business corporations are governed by the same basic criteria of section
23(a) (1) (A) as individuals. However, the nature of a corporation as a business
entity does not raise the problem as to whether it is engaged in a trade or busin'ess,
and, of course, there is no competition with the personal expense concept. The
basic problem is simply whether the payment is "ordinary and necessary".
Prior to 1936, contributions or gifts by corporations could be deducted from
gross income only if they qualified as business expense. The 1936 Revenue Act
added what is now section 23 (q) permitting a corporation a charitable deduction
limited to five per cent of net income before the deduction.22 9 In 1938, section
23(a) (1) (B) was added to provide that a gift qualifying under section 23(q)
would automatically disqualify as a business expense under section 23(a).280
The purpose of this latter provision was to give substantial effect to the five per
cent limitation of section 23(q). These provisions seem to have substantially reduced the volume of litigation on the question of whether a gift is an ordinary and
necessary business expense.
In light of the foregoing provisions, classification would seem to command
a distinction between payments made to qualifying section 23(q) organizations
and those made to non-qualifying organizations. A third group of problems,
growing in importance, results from payments made in aid of the education of
corporate employees. A consideration of these problems will provide the final
category discussed herein.
For the legislative history see 4 Mertens, § 25.96-25.97, n.'s. 51 and 52, pp. 497-498. For text
of § 23(o) (2), similar to § 23(q) (2), see supra n.23.
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Ibid. For current text of § 23(a) (1) (B) see infra n.232.
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Payments Made to Section 2 3 (q) Organizations.The major problems in connection with the character of a corporate gift as a deductible contribution were
discussed in the second part of this study. 2 81 Therefore, the scope of inquiry under
this heading at this point is limited to a single broad problem of the payment to
a section 23(q) organization supported by a consideration.
Section 23(a) (1) (B) makes no specific provision for the treatment of a
payment to an educational, or other qualifying charity, under section 23(q) supported by a consideration.2 32 Implicit, however, would be its non-applicability
where a payment is not, in fact, a gift. And the regulations so provide:
"The limitations provided in section 23(a) (1) and this section
apply only to payments which are in fact contributions or gifts to organizations described in section 23(q). For example, payments by a street
railway corporation to a local hospital (which is a charitable organization
within the meaning of section 23 (q)) in consideration of a binding obligation on the part of the hospital to provide hospital services and facilities for the corporation's employees are not contributions or gifts
within the meaning of section 2'3(q) and may be deductible under sec28
tion 23 (a) if the requirements of that section are otherwise satisfied."
These provisions do not seem to have presented too many difficulties. ThL
only litigated case is the relatively recent decision of the Tax Court in McDonnell
2 84 Here, the taxpayer, a St. Louis aircraft manufacturer,
Aircraft Corporation.
made a $5,000 grant to Washington University. The corporate board resolution
called the payment a "contribution". The payment was conditioned upon it being allowed as a donation for tax purposes and that the university would be able
to obtain firm commitments to cover the engineering school budget and provide
a course in aeronautical engineering. On the taxpayer's return the $5,000 was
deducted as an educational contribution, and the total contributions were within
the five per cent limit. However, upon application of a carry-back loss, the taxpayer's total contributions exceeded by some $3,500 the five per cent limitation.
The taxpayer claimed this excess should be allowed as a business expense under
the regulations set out above.
The Tax Court denied the deduction on grounds that the evidence failed to
show that the university was bound to do anything in exchange for the money. The
court admitted that there were some facts giving color to the taxpayer's claim,
but it seemed highly impressed by the original characterization of the payment as
Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education", 58 DICKINSON
LAW REVIEW 189 (March, 1954).
282 Sec.23(a) (1) (B) provides: "No deduction shall be allowable under subparagraph (A) to
a corporation for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction under subsection (q) were it not for the 5 per centum limitation therein contained and for the requirement
therein that payment must be made within the taxable year." The regulations illustrate its application thusly, "if a corporation makes a contribution of $5,000, only $4,000 of which is deductible
under section 23(q) (whether because of the 5 per cent limitation or requirement of actual payment,
or both), no deduction is allowable under section 23(a) for the remaining $1,000." Reg.118,
§ 39.23(a)-13(a).
2388 Ibid., § 39.23(a)-13(b).
284 16 T.C. 189 (1951), dismissed on consent, 191 F.2d 733 (C.A.8th 1951).
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a gift. It also stated that "many. . .contributions to colleges are limited to support
some particular phase of activity and many are in consideration of the gifts of
others. But these facts do not automatically render such contributions business
285
expenses."
From a planning viewpoint, this situation presents some problems. Should
the taxpayer attempt a "binding agreement" and fail, he runs the risk of a total
loss of the deduction for want of donative intent. Perhaps this is borrowing
trouble, but an administrative ruling could clarify this. With a growing recognition on the part of business corporations of a moral obligation to support private education,286 equity here would seem to demand clarity. A total loss of a
deduction would not seem to be justified in such a situation.
Payments Made to Non-Qualifying Organizations. Payments made to educational organizations not qualifying under section 23(q) and, as indicated above,
those founded upon a consideration must meet the basic criteria of section 23(a)
in order to qualify as a business expense. Section 39.23 (a) -13 of the current regulations provide in this respect:
"Donations to organizations other than those described in section
23(q) which bear a direct relationship to the corporation's business and
are made with a reasonable expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the donation may constitute allowable deductions as business expenses. For example, a street railway corporation
may donate a sum of money to an organization (of a class not referred
to m section 23(q) ) intending to hold a convention in the city in which
it operates, with a reasonable expectation that the holding of such convention will augment its income through a greater number of people
using its cars."
As indicated above, prior to 1936, a gift or contribution by a corporation to
be allowed as a deduction at all must qualify as a business expense. Therefore, the
decisions rendered on returns prior to 1936 would be in point here in determining whether the "ordinary and necessary" requirements are met.
Broadly, the test in determining whether a payment to an educational organization is "ordinary and necessary" is, as the regulations indicate, whether or not
the payment bears a "direct relationship" to the corporate business. This, of course,
furnishes no more aid in solving a particular problem than the use of the terms
"ordinary and necessary". Of more help is an examination of the criteria that
the courts have said indicates a direct or indirect relationship.
Most of the taxpayer victories in this area have resulted from a showing of
some type of patronage received directly from the recipient. For 'example, in C. M.
285

Ibid., 16 T.C. at 199.

"All of these considerations must lead the reflecting mind to the conclusion that nothing
conducive to public welfare, other than perhaps public safety is more important than the preservation of the privately supported institutions of learning which embrace in their enrollment about
half the college-attending youth of the country." Stein, J.S.C., in A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 26
N.J.Super.106, 97 A.2d 186 (1953), affm'd., 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953), upholding a gift
by an industrial concern to Princeton University against a claim that the gift was ultra vires. For
a scholarship plan designed to meet the desires of industry to support education see 62 Time No.25,
p.74 (December 21, 1953).
286
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Guggenheimer, Inc.,2 87 the taxpayer, a small town department store, contributed
sums to three colleges, a Y.M.C.A., a Y.W.C.A., a hospital and several other
charities. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed all of the contributions as business
expense because the testimony of a corporate officer was said to support a showing of a direct benefit either through a prior understanding or through a known
result of increased business from the various recipients. A similar result has been
reached where an electric power company contributed to an endowment fund of
a local college, a substantial patron of the taxpayer.2 83
On the other hand, contributions motivated primarily by the fact that such
gifts are "good business ' ' 2 9 or because the taxpayer felt some obligation to a college recipient because of the taxpayer's withdrawal as a tenant 240 have not been
allowed. Further, even where contributions to charitable organizations have been
influenced in part by the amount of trade received, unless the correlation of gift
to trade is reasonably dose, the courts are not apt to be influenced in finding that
241
a direct relationship exists.
A finding of a direct relationship, however, is not limited to the increased
trade pattern. For example, in Holt-GraniteMills Co.,242 the taxpayer contributed
$10,000 to a school district to assist it in erecting a badly needled school. Some
eighty to ninety per cent of the students in the district were children of the taxpayer's employees, and there were other manufacturing plants within a five mile
radius in school districts with superior facilities. The Board of Tax Appeals allowed the gift as a business expense on the grounds that it directly affected the
taxpayer's business in that adequate school facilities would tend toward a reduced
labor turnover and would improve employee morale.
A case that illustrates what might well be a growing trend in industry-education institution relationships, and similar to the McDonnell case pattern, is
Times-Picayune Publishing Co.2 43 In this case, the taxpayer, a newspaper publisher, had experienced difficulty in procuring efficient reporters. He had attempted ,without success, to get local Tulane University to establish a department
237
238

28,021, P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec.
Yamhill Electric Co., 20 B.T.A. 1232 (1930); accord: Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co.,

103 F.2d 947 (C.C.A.8th 1939).
289 Harry A. Koch Co., 23 B.T.A. 161 (1931).

240 J. A. Majors Co., 5 B.T.A. 260 (1926).
241 J. A. Majors Co., 5 B.T.A. 260 (1926); Adam, Meldrum and Anderson Co., 29 B.T.A. 419
(1933); Adam, Meldrum and Anderson Co.,
34,021, P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec.
242 1 B.T.A. 1246 (1925) ; cf., E. M. Holt Plaid Mills, Inc., 9 B.T.A. 1360 (1928), where the
taxpayer contributed to three churches attended by its employees who composed twenty to thirtyfive per cent of their membership, the Board stating that, "it has not been shown that these contributions were necessary in order to afford petitioner's employees church facilities."
An off-the-beaten-track type of direct relationship was found to exist in B. Manischewitz, 10
T.C. 1139 (1948). In this case, payments were made to a foreign Jewish seminary. Deductions
were allowed upon a showing that the missionaries from the school aided the taxpayer in helping
to overcome the impression that the taxpayer's machine made matzoth were not kosher, as required by Jewish dietary law. The court also said that the taxpayer's personal and religious motives
did not prevent characterization as a business expense "provided there are reasonably evident business ends to be served and the intention to serve them appears adequately from the record."
248 27 B.T.A. 277 (1932).
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or chair of journalism. The taxpayer then contracted with Tulane to pay them
$6,000 a year for ten years, Tulane agreeing to maintain a school of journalism.
The $6,000, the department's only income, was used solely for the chair. The
Board of Tax Appeals allowed the deduction stating that it was clear that the payment was not intended as a gift but was a "cold-blooded business proposition".
While the Times-Picayune case involved a tax year prior to 1936, presumably
the same result would be reached under the regulations set out above. Where a
binding contract exists not only is the corporation free of the five per cent limitation, but also it would be able to justify to its shareholders a more extensive aid
2 44
to education.
Payments in Aid of Employees Education. Payments in aid of employees education might take two forms: direct aid to individuals and aid granted an employee's welfare organization.
(1) Direct aid: Where an employee is aided directly, as a form of a fringe
benefit, the payment would ordinarily have to qualify as "a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered" under
section 23(a) (1) (A) of the Code. How widespread is such a business practice is
difficult to ascertain. The little authority on the matter might indicate that such a
fringe benefit is not a common industrial practice or that such a transaction is
clearly a payment of additional compensation. The latter would seem justified.
With full time employees, the training in such situations would probably be limited to part time schooling of some type. In one early ruling, the Service held that
where a corporation encouraged or required employee attendance at part time
schools, it could deduct reasonable amounts paid as245compensation to such employees during their absence from their employment.
Another type of full time employee educational training would be temporary
absence in the taking of refresher courses and in attending educational institutes.
In Pacific Grape Products Co.,246 the Tax Court allowed a deduction for the traveling expenses of two employee-chemists attending a refresher school. The taxpayer was a canner, and the courses were to acquaint the chemists with the new
developments in the food processing industry. How far could an employer go in
underwriting a long term leave of abs'ence? While the requirment of "services actually rendered" might not be satisfied, it is arguable that a demonstrable need for such
trained personnel might satisfy the "ordinary and necessary" criterion.
Another type of direct educational aid on which there seems to be a want
of authority from the standpoint of a business expense is the corporate scholarship
See supra n. 236.
O.D.850, 4 C.B. 30 (1921). The costs of outside speakers have been allowed as business expenses, Lewis-Hall Iron Works, 2 B.T.A. 788 (1925), as well as instruction costs of training
apprentices, I.T. 3403, 1940-2 C.B. 63. In I.T.1304, 1-1 C.B. 72 (1922), supra n.15, corporate
expenditures for books, tuition, etc. were ruled taxable income to their employees. Presumably
deductions would be allowed the payor. See Hoffman, "Fringe Benefits For Employees," 31 Taxes
999, 1001-1002 (1953).
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17 T.C. 1097 (1952).
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award. While such payments can not as yet be deemed common, there is a growing recognition of the desirability of such programs from the long range standpoint of labor pools. Unless the recipient renders substantial services, such payments could hardly qualify as reasonable compensation. Could they qualify as
ordinary and necessary expenses? If there were an immediate and acute personnel
shortage in the particular industry and a binding contract of some type, by analogy
to the Times-Picayune case, it is arguable that such an expenditure would be suffi,
citntly direct as to so qualify. On the other hand, if the purpose was merely to
fill the needs of a long range industry-wide labor pool, a taxpayer might find that
he could not surmount arguments that the benefits were indirect or that the expenditure was of a capital nature.
(2) Employee welfare organizations: The second form that employee educational benefit might take is through the medium of an employees' welfare organization. Of course, if the organization qualifies under section 23(q), the corporation is subject to the five p'er cent limitation and the payment is governed by the
charitable contribution criteria. However, an employee organization might well
have the educational development of its members as simply one of many objectives without qualifying under section 23 (q). This would seem to be representative
of the typical situation. Therefore, if the organization does not qualify under
section 23 (q), would an employer contribution constitute an ordinary and necessary
Clothing Co. decision would seem to be persuasive
business 'expense? The Weil
24 7
authority that it would.
In the Weil Clothing case, the employee group, devoted primarily to the payment of sick and disability benefits, had been ruled a section 101(8) organization. In 1943, the taxpayer made one payment of $829.50, 'equal to the dues
collected, in accordance with past practice, and made a special payment of $12,000
to improve the financial structure of the organization and to enable it to more
adequately meet the anticipated demands on the organization's funds. The special
payment constituted about six per cent of the taxpayer's annual payroll. The employee group had thirty-nine members, a majority of the taxpayer's personnel.
The Tax Court allowed the full amounts as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. The Commissioner's position was evidently based on a line of cases denying similar expenditures as business expenses where the payor either retained
a control over the payments or where the employees did not receive a pres'ent interest.248 These cases were distinguished. The court also rejected the Commissioner's capital expenditure argument on the'grounds that while the taxpayer received a ben'efit, it was not one which should be capitalized.
247 13 T.C. 873 (1949); cf., discussion in second part of this study, 58 DICKINSON LAW
REVIEW 189, 207-210, e.g. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188 (1952), non-acq., 1952-2 C.B.5,
supra, n. 143.
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rev'd., 162 F.2d 379 (C.C.A.6th 1947); Robertson

v. Steele's Mills, 172 F. 2d 817 (C.A.4th 1949), c.d., 338 U.S. 848, 70 S.Ct. 86 (1949) ; Roberts
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The little authority involving corporate payments in aid of employee's education as business expenses precludes a satisfactory synthesis. Further judicial and
administrative developments might be anticipated. What authority that does exist,
however, does not indicate a hostility in the courts toward a claim of such expenditures as business expenses.
PART IV
H.R.8300-THE 1954 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
At this writing, H.R.8300, the proposed Internal Revenue Code of 1954, has
passed the House. Changes can be anticipated in the Senate and in Conference.
Whether the changes will affect the problems here under consideration may be
doubtful. Two reasons can be advanced for this. The proposed legislation does
not seem to depart materially from existing case law nor constitute a material invasion of the revenue. Further, the legislation is reported to have involved some
two years of intensive technical study. It is not likely that too many of the technical
changes will b'e summarily thrown overboard. With these reservations, the foregoing study will be effected as indicated.
24
The Receipt: Is It Income or a Gift? 9

Section 61(a) of the new Code, corresponding to section 22 (a) of the 1939
Code, still expressly embraces "compensation for services, including fees, commissions and similar items", as one of the many income categories. Now explicit
is the established judicial doctrine that the listing of income items is illustrative,
not exclusive.
Section 102 (a) of the new Code, corresponding to section 22(b) (3) of the
1939 Code, expressly excludes gifts from gross income. Therefore, superficially,
there is no change in basic approach. However, the detailed Code provisions discussed below do indicate a substantial departure from the old norms.
The Contest Prize. Section 74(a) of the new Code is new. It provides that:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 117 (relating
to scholarsh1ips and fellowship grants), gross income includes amounts
received as prizes and awards.
The committee report states that this rule would overrule both the Washburn
and the McDermott cases. However, the latter was overruled by th-e Supreme Court
in the Robertson decision and the Washburn case has been rejected by the Treasury.
This general rule, however, should remove any doubt in the minds of a few federal
2 50
judges such as in the Bates case.
Chommie, "Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education", 58 DICKINSON
LAW REVIEW 93 (January, 1954).
250 Supra n.4. For a recent decision holding a commercial prize (automobile) in a newspaper
circulation contest taxable, see Reynolds v. United States, 118 F.Supp. 911 (D.C.N.D.Calif. 1954),
distinguishing the Bates and Washburn cases, supra n.4. It might be noted that the Supreme Court
has recently reversed the Federal Communications Commission ruling prohibiting radio and television give-away programs. Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., U.S., 74 S.Ct. 593 (1954). But for the 1954 Internal Revenue Code the standing
of the Washburn case would therefore again assume considerable importance.
249
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It might be noted that the new provision is wider in scope than the decision
in the Robertson case, limited as it was to the formal contest. No contract limitation
25
is imposed upon the provision as it is now proposed. 1
The Scholarship Award and the Research Fellowship. Section 117 of the new
Code has no corresponding provision in the 1939 Code.2 52 Section 117 (a), stating
the general rule, expressly excludes from gross income scholarship and fellowship
awards for study at educational institutions as defined in section 151(e) (4),251
in short, at institutions where a regular faculty and student body is maintained.
2 51 The provision is not unlike that proposed by the American Law Institute Income Tax Project, draft of which was deposited with the Treasury and the Ways and Means Committee. See
Surrey, "The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute", 31 Taxes 959 (1953). The influence of this project on H.R.8300 is deserving of a separate study as an objective lesson in what
can be accomplished by cooperative legal research in even so complex an area as federal taxation.
It might be noted that one of the salient features of the project, correlation of the income, estate
and gift taxes, does seem to have been rejected. This is said without a studied comparison. However, the project contemplated a common gift definition. This seems to have been rejected and the
common law concept still retained for income tax purposes.
252 SEC.117. SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS. (a) General Rule.-In the case
of an individual, gross income does not include-(1) any amount received as a scholarship (including the value of contributed services and accommodations) at an educational institution (as
4
defined in section 151(e)( ), or as fellowship grant; and (2) any amount received to cover expenses for-(A) travel, (B) research, (C) clerical help, or (D) equipment, which are incident
to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient. (b) Limitations.-( 1) Teaching or research services.-Subsection (a)
shall not apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment for teaching or
research services in the nature of part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the
scholarship or fellowship grant. (2) Individuals not candidates for degrees.-In the case of an
individual who is not a candidate for a degree, subsection (a) shall not apply to amounts received as scholarships or as fellowship grants if the annual amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant (excluding amounts described in subsection (a) (2)) plus sabbatical year compensation from the recipient's employer prior to receiving the scholarship or fellowship is seventy-five
per cent or more of the recipient's salary, if employed, or earned income (as defined in section
911 (b)), if not employed, in the twelve month period ending with the month preceding the month
in which the scholarship or fellowship is granted. It might also be noted that indirect aid to education was also provided in sec. 152(d) of the new Code in that for purposes of the dependency
allowance of sec. 152(a) it is provided: "(d) Special Support Test in Case of Students.-For the
purposes of subsection (a), in the case of any individual who is-(1) a son, stepson, daughter
or stepdaughter of the taxpayer (within the meaning of this section), and (2) a student (within
the meaning of section 151(e)(4), amounts received as scholarships for study at an educational
institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)) shall not be taken into account in determining
whether such individual received more than half his support from the taxpayer."
253 Sec. 151(e)(4) in defining "educational institution" provides that it "means only an educational institution which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has
a regularly organized body of students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are
carried on". The committee report amplifies this. "It means primary and secondary schools, preparatory schools, colleges, universities, normal schools, technical and mechanical schools and the like,
but does not include non-educational institutions, correspondence schools, on the job training,
night schools and the like." Ways and Means Committee Report No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.,
4 P-H Tax Ser., f 66,000. 137-138, hereinafter cited to tax service. The exclusion of "night
schools" seems questionable in light of the wording of the Code.
The committee report also explains the application of § 117(a) to faculty children tuition
remittance plans. "If an educational institution...maintains or participates in a plan whereby the
tuition of a child of a faculty member of any such institution is remitted at any other participating
educational institution. . .attended by such child, the amount of tuition so remitted shall be con66,000.134. Perhaps
sidered to be an amount received as a scholarship under this section." Ibid.,
the fair import of such plans is the award of a scholarship, but it is also arguable that such comment constitutes rule making by committee report.
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The exclusion expressly extends to amounts received, to the extent actually expendeLd, for travel, research, clerical help and equipment.
This general rule is more precise, but, in effect, could be said to bring about
the same result obtained by I.T.4056 that a grant made to further the individual
254
training of an individual, no services being required, is a gift.

Section 117(b), however, contains two important limitations on the general
rule. First, section 117(b) (1) expressly provides that the general rule is inapplicable wh'ere the grant or award is, in effect, a working fellowship. This seems
to be but a codification of the Tax Court position taken in the Banks and Doerge
cases. 255 Second, section 117(b) (2) imposes a qualified limitation on non-degree
tesearch awards. This provision seems to be int'ended to apply to situations where
the recipient is, in effect, simply continuing his previous activities now funded by
a scholarship or fellowship grant. Apparently realizing that grants are sometimes
small in relation to previous working salaries, an arbitrary test of seventy-five
per cent is applied. In other words, if the award is in excess of seventy-five per
cent of salary (or earned income as defined in section 911 (b)) 256 for the previous
twelve months, the general rule of exclusion does not apply.
In computing the amount of the award, amounts received for travel, research, clerical help or equipment are excluded, and amounts received representing
"sabbatical year or other compensation from the recipient's employer prior to receiving the scholarship or fellowship grant" are included. (Emphasis added) The
antecedent to the term "prior" is the term "employer". An annualization of the
awards seems to be provided by the use of the term "annual amount of the scholarship or fellowship grant", and has been so illustrated by example in the committee
report. 25
254

7

Supra n.13.

255 Supra n.17.
256 Sec.911(b) in defining "earned income" excludes corporate distribution "which represents
a distribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation", and also
establishes an arbitrary rule where "both personal services and capital are material income-producing
factors" of a "reasonabe allowance as compensation for personal services" but not in excess of

thirty per cent of net profits.
257 "A and B are research chemists employed by the X company at salaries of $10,000 per annum. . . .On September 1, 1954, B receives a fellowship grant of $5,400 to engage in research for

the academic year (9 months) but is not a candidate for a degree. He also receives $50 a month
from X company during the term of the fellowship as an inducement to accept the fellowship. The
annualized amount of the fellowship is twelve-ninths of $5,400 or $7,200. B also receives $450

from X, his previous employer, during the term of the fellowship. The total of these two amounts is
$7,650. The fellowship grant would not be excluded from income. Assume the above facts with
respect to B except that he receives no compensation from X during the term of the fellowship and,
upon completion of the fellowship, he returns to his job with X and is paid $1,000 per month. In

such case, the annual amount of the fellowship is $7,200, no compensation is received from X
during the term of the fellowship and hence, the $7,200 is excludable from gross income by B,

unless subsection (b) (1) applied." 4 P-H Tax. Ser.,
66,000.135. Computation is hardly necessary
to demonstrate that the $50 a month payment to B could hardly be labeled an "inducement" in the
usual situation. If B were married with two dependants and took the standard deduction, his tax on
$5,850 would be $570 on a twenty per cent base rate. In such situations, "inducements" will undoubtedly be deferred until a return to employment.
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The statute does not expressly provide for treatment of award renewals, but
the language seems to justify the rule for computation stated by the committee:
"It is intended by your Committee that the extension or renewal
shall be treated as a separate scholarship or fellowship grant but that the
income in the 12 preceding month's period used in the seventy-five per
cent test shall be the income in the 12-month
period prior to the grant of
2 8
the original scholarship or fellowship."
To the extent that research scholarship and fellowship awards do not exceed
seventy-five per cent of the previous twelve month's salary, Section 117(b) (2)
constitutes a rejection of the Service position taken in I.T.4056. 25 9 Where the
awards do so exceed seventy-five per cent, it constitutes an acceptance of the ruling, perhaps the result of a compromise with the Treasury.
The Achievement Award. Section 74(b) of the new Code expressly excludes
from the application of the general rule that gross income includes prizes and
awards, that is "amounts received as prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational artistic, or civic achievement". 2 60 This exception is applicable only if the recipient has not taken steps
to enter the contest and is not required to render substantial future services as a
condition to its receipt. The committee report indicates that such awards as the
Nobel prize would be thus excluded, and also amplifies the section's application:
"Subsection (b) is not intended to exclude prizes or awards from
an employer to an employee in recognition of some achievement in connection with his employment, such as having the largest sales record or
best production record during a certain period. Amounts received from
radio and television giveaway shows, or as door prizes, or in any similar type contest would also not be covered by subsection (b)."
Section 74(b) seems to be but a codification of previous administrative practice and is in accord with the dictum of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Robertson
case. 2 61
Summary. Generally, these new Code provisions codify existing administrative practice and judicial rule. The principal departure is the exclusion of the research fellowship award not meeting the seventy-five per cent test. However,
these new provisions suggest a number of perplexing questions. Where now stands
donative intent? Would it be impossible for an employer to make a gift to an employee taking a leave of absence to engage in research? Would the recipient of a
scholarship contest prize be governed by section 74(a) or section 117(a)? Would
268
269

260

Ibid.
1951-2 C.B. 8, discussed supra n.15.

Sec.74(b) provides: "(b) Exception.-Gross income does not include amounts received as

prizes and awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational,

artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if-(1) the recipient was selected without any
action on his part to enter the contest or proceeding; and (2) the recipient is not required to
render substantial future services as a condition to receiving the prize or award." It might be noted

that the Treasury has now ruled that a Pulitzer prize, discussed supra n.21, is a gift. Rev. Rul.
54-110, 1954-14 I.R.B. 4.

261

Supra n.20.
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it be impossible for the sponsor of a contest to manifest donative intent toward
the entrants and award prizes in addition to those competed for?
The answer to some of the difficulty may, perhaps, lie in considering whether
ot not the new provisions constitute a change in approach. Under existing case
law and administrative ruling, the basic approach is simply: Has the taxpayer
established a donative intent on the part of the payor? Do these new Code provisions now focus on the new criteria leaving section 102(a) (donative intent)
hovering in the background? If the answer is yes, the new provisions should have
a decided clarifying effect. But, donative intent has proved to be a tough, elastic
concept.2 62 Attempts to confine it are perhaps worthy of the effort. However,
how it will manifest itself now must await administrative and judicial development.
The Payment: Is It A Charitable (Educational) Contribution?
Section 170 of the proposed Code, using the committee report term, "consolidates" sections 23(0), 23(q) and 120 of the 1939 Code.263 The significant
For a recent discussion of the intent factor in federal income taxation see Fischer, "Intent
and Taxes", 32 Taxes 303 (1954).
263 SEC.170 CHARITABLE, ETC. CONTRIBUTIONS AND GIFTS. (a) Allowance of Deduction.-(1) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as
defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowed as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate. (2) Corporations on accrual basis.-(b) Limitations.-(1) Individuals.-In the
case of an individual the deduction provided in subsection (a) shall be limited as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D). (A) Special rule.-Any charitable contribution to-(i) a
church, a convention or association of churches, or a religious order, (ii) an educational organization referred to in section 503(b)(2), or (iii) a hospital referred to in section 503(b)(5),
shall be allowed to the extent of ten per cent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income computed
without regard to any net operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section 172. (B)
General limitation.-The total deductions under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not
exceed twenty per cent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income computed without regard to any
net operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section 172. For purposes of this subparagraph, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be computed without regard to any deduction allowed under subparagraph (A) but shall take into account any charitable contributions to the organizations described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) which are in excess of the amount allowable
as a deduction under subparagraph (A). (C) Unlimited deduction for certain individuals.-(D)
Denial of deduction in case of certain transfers in trust.-No deduction shall be allowed under
this section for the value of any interest in property transferred after March 9, 1954, to a trust if(i) the grantor has a reversionary interest in the corpus or income of that portion of the trust with
respect to which a deduction would (but for this subparagraph) be allowable under this section;
and (ii) at the time of the transfer the value of such reversionary interest exceeds five per cent of
the value of the property constituting such portion of the trust. For the purposes of this subparagraph, a power exercisable by the grantor or a non-adverse party (within the meaning of section
672(b)), or both, to revest in the grantor property or income therefrom shall be treated as a revetsionary interest. (2) Corporations.-In the case of a corporation, the total deductions under
subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed five per cent of the taxpayer's taxable income
computed with regard to-(c) Charitable Contributions Defined.-For the purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-(1) A
State, a Territory, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is
made for exclusively public purposes. (2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or
foundation-(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under
the law of the United States, any State or Territory, the District of Columbia, or any possession
of the United States; (B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, or for the
benefit of any government referred to in paragraph (1) ; (C) no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and (D) no substantial part of the
262
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substantive change pertinent to this study is contained in section 170(b) (1) (A),
characterized as a "special rule", providing an additional ten per cent deduction
for contributions paid directly to a special group of charities. One of these is "an
educational organization referred to in section 503(b) (2) ",264 in short, an L-ducational institution maintaining a regular faculty and student body. The general
twenty per cent limitation for individuals is maintained, and it is provided that
any amount in excess of the ten per cent allowed under the "special rule", is to
he taken into account under the general limitation. The committee report illustrates
the computation:
"For example, if an individual pays a charitable contribution of
$2,000 to a university and $1,200 to an organization not described in
subsection (b) (1) (A), and if such individual's adjusted gross income-is
$10,000, then the deduction allowed under section 170(a) would be
$3,000. The first $1,000 paid to the university is allowed under the
special rule ....However, the second $1,000 is taken into account under
subparagraph (B) (the general limitation) with the $1,200 paid to th
organization not described in subparagraph (A); by applying the twenty
per cent limitation of subparagraph
(B), only $2,000 of the $2,200 is
265
allowed as a deduction."
The educational institution thus secures an additional benefit. The donor
whos'e charity would exceed the twenty per cent limitation but who could not meet
the rigid requirements of the ninety per cent rule of the unlimited deduction provision, is thus furnished with additional incentive to contribute. It should be noted,
however, that the new Code liberalizes the unlimited charitable deduction. Section 170(b) (1) (C) provides that the ninety per cent test is to be satisfied where
the contributions exceed ninety per cent of net income for nine of the ten preceding years instead of for each of the ten preceding years as section 120 cur2 66
rently provides.
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. A
contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund or foundation shall be deductible by
reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United States or any of its possessions
exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B). (3) A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary unit or society of, or trust or foundation for, any such post or organization(A) organized in the United States or any of its possessions, and (B) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. (4) In the case of
a contribution or gift by an individual, a domestic fraternal society, order, or association, operating
under the lodge system, but only if such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals. (d) Disallowance of Deductions in Certain Cases.-(e) Other Cross References.-The
new Code provision for the trust and estates' charitable contribution deduction is found in § 642(c)
(§ 162(a) of the 1939 Code); the Estate Tax in § 2055(a)(2) (§ 812(d) of the 1939 Code);
the Gift Tax in § 2522(a)(2) (§1004 of the 1939 Code). The § 101 exempt organizations arc
now listed in § 501 of the new Code. Supra n.'s 23, 24, 25, and 67.
264 Sec.503(b) (2)
defines an "educational organization" in terms similar to an "educational institution" defined in § 151(e)(4), supra n. 253.
265 4 P-H Tax Ser.,
66,000.149 (1954). "It is to be noted that such charitable contributions
must be paid to the organization and not for the use of the organization. Accordingly, payments to
a trust (where the beneficiary is an organization described in said clauses (i), (ii), or (iii)) are
not included under this special rule." Ibid., p 66,ooo.148.
266 Supra n.24.
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Subject Matter and Mode of Transfer. The significant contribution in this
area is a loophole plugging provision designed to meet an abuse not embraced
within the subject matter of this study, viz, the short-term charitable trust, a blood
relative to the short-term or Clifford trust.26 7
The loophole provision is understandable only in light of the new provisions dealing with the so-called Clifford trusts. Section 673 of the new Code
deals with reversionary interests, a matter covered only in the Clifford regulations
under the 1939 Code. Section 673(a), stating the general rule, taxes the income
of reversionary trusts of less than ten years duration to the grantor. However, section 673 (b) provides a liberal exception:
"Subsection (a) shall not apply to the 'extent that the income of a
portion of a trust in which the grantor has a reversionary interest is, under the terms of the trust, irrevocably payable for a period of at least 2
years (commencing with the date of the transfer) to a designated beneficiary, which beneficiary is of a type described in section 170(b) (1)
(A) (i),(ii), or (iii)."
Under this provision, a taxpayer could create a three year trust for the ben,fit of any special rule organization, and secure a deduction for the year of creation
for the present value of the three year term. At the same time he would not be
taxable on the trust income during the term of the trust. In this manner, he could,
in effect, increase his charitable contributions beyond the section 170 limitations.
With the Treasury efforts to apply the Clifford regulations to the short-term
charitable trust largely unsuccessful, it is apparent that section 673(b) would invite still further abuse of the charitable limitations provisions. To curtail what has
been labeled "in effect a double deduction", section 170(b) (1) (D) was added
to H.R.8300 on the floor of the House.2 68
This provision proposes to deny a deduction "for the value of any interest in
property transferred after March 9, 1954, to a trust if the grantor has a reversionary
interest in the corpus or income. . .and at the time the value of such reversionary
interest exceeds five per cent of the value of the property .... 269 A reversionary
interest includes a power to revest in the grantor "exercisable by the grantor or
a nonadverse party. . .or both".

267 See e.g. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (C.A.7th 1953); Rev. Rul. 54-48, 1954-6 I.R.B.
5. For a discussion of the cases on short term charitable trusts see Note, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 164.
268 In introducing the amendment on the floor of the House, it was said: "This amendment
was unanimously adopted by the Committee and its purpose is to plug the loophole which has been
in existing law. The loophole was made more apparent at the time the Committee adopted the
liberalization policy in regards to charitable trusts created for a term of years with reversionary
rights to the grantor. Under existing law, by means of these charity trusts, a grantor was able in
effect to get two deductions, first for the amount which was deducted from his gross income, and
then the same amount as a charitable deduction. This amendment simply provides that only the
deduction from gross income is granted and the charitable deduction is not granted." Cong. Record,
March 18, 1954, p 3356.
269 Full text cited supra n.263. The technique was probably suggested by the 1949 Technical
Changes Act provision providing the test for inclusion of reversionary interests in a decedent's
gross estate. I.R.C. § 811(c) (2) and (3), now provided for in new Code § 2037.
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It will be noted that it is limited to transfers in trust, and to situations where
there is a power to revest in the grantor alone. It probably suggests a number of
other limitations of an avoidable nature. However, where applicable, it seems to
have a much more drastic effect than would the application of the Clifford regulations to the short term charitable trust for the purposes of an allowable deduction.
What Is Education? A Social Organization?A PropagandaOrganization?The
proposed Code contemplates no substantial changes in the foregoing areas. However, it should be noted that an educational propaganda organization such as Facts
Forum, discussed in the second part of this study,27 0 would not be embraced within the application of the new "special rule". Therefore, the sponsors or donors
of such an organization will still b'e subject to the twenty per cent limitation.
What Is A Business Organization?The proposed Code contemplates no substantial changes in this area. Section 502 of the new Code now embraces the feeder organization provision separately from the general listing of exempt organizations in section 501, section 101 of the 1939 Code. It should be noted that the
term "supplement U income" has been eliminated, being replaced by the term
"unrelated business taxable income"; the term "supplement U lease" is replaced
27
by the term "business lease". '
What Is A Private Purpose?No substantial changes are proposed in this area
germane to the problem here under survey.27 2 The prohibited transactions of the
1950Revenue Act are now found in section 503, section 3813 of the 1939 Code.
The non-deductibility sanctions pertinent here, are now found in section 681 (b)
(5), section 162(g) (2) (E) of the 1939 Code; and in section 503(e), section
3813(e) of the 1939 Code. Section 503(b) lists the excepted organizations provided for in section 3813(a) of the 1939 Code. Section 503(c), section 3813(b)
of the 1939 Code, and section 681(b) (2), section 16 2 (g) (2) (B)

of the 1939

Code, list the prohibited transactions that give rise to the loss of and the limitations
on the deductions.
One minor change is proposed. Section 681 (b) (1), corresponding to section
16 2(g) (2) (A) of the 1939 Code, brings the trust's deduction to the twenty per
cent level from the fifteen per cent level, when the prohibited transaction sanctions have been imposed. The committee report indicates that the purpose of the
increase was to "correlate the limitation with the charitable deduction allowed to
individuals under section 170(b) of this bill".27 3
Summary. In general, the most significant changes proposed by the new Code
a; regards the problem of educational deductions, are the increased allowance of
ten per cent under the "special rule" and the loophole provision of section 170
(b) (1) (D). The effect of the former proposal is to create two classes of edu270 supra n.105.
P71 Sec.511-515 incl. of the proposed Code.
272 It might be noted that certain employee pension trusts are now expressly made subject to the
vrohibited transactions provisions. Sec.503(a) (1), referring to § 501(e). See also § 505.
78 4 P-H Tax Ser., p 66,000.293 (1954).
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rational organizations, the preferred "special rule" organization and the general
limitation organization. In time to come perhaps some litigation may be anticipated
as to whether a particular organization falls within the special rule. It is to be noted
that the deduction limitation refers to the definition contained in section 503, a
carry-over definition from the 1950 Revenue Act, while the scholarship and fellowship limitation refers to the definition contained in section 151. The committee report is silent on the former, but as regards the section 151 definition of
an educational institution comments:
"The term 'educational institution' means a school maintaining
a regular faculty and established curriculum and having an organized
body of students in attendance. It means primary and secondary schools,
preparatory schools, coll'eges, universities, normal schools, technical and
mechanical schools and the like, but does not include noneducational institutions, correspondence schools, on the job training, night schools and
the like."
It should be pointed out that the language of section 151 (e) (4), which is
substantially 'equivalent to the language in section 503(b) (2), does not justify
the distinction made in the committee report based on the time of the day in which
instruction is offered. 274 Perhaps the term "night schools" in the report is an inadvertence.
The Payment: Is It A Business Expense?
Section 162 (a) (1) and (2) of the proposed Code is substantially equivalent
to the portion of section 23(a) (1) (A) of the 1939 Code set out in Part III
above.2 75 No substantial changes are proposed. The new Code retains the same
76
basic "ordinary and necessary" criteria for both individuals and corporations.
Similarly, section 262 of the proposed Code adopts in substance the terminology
of section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code by simply providing that "except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses".
In a relocation move, the non-trade and non-business expense provision of
section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Code, was removed from the general classification
of business expense to an area covering additional deductions for individuals.
However, no substantive change is proposed and s'ection 212(1) and (2) corresponds to section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Code.
While no change in basic approach is contemplated, the new Code does propose one significant change. As discussed above in conncction with corporate deductions, section 23(a) (1) (B) of the 1939 Code provides that a corporate pay274
275

Supra n. 253 and n. 264.

Sec. 162(a) as pertinent here provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or

business, including -(1)
a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered; (2) traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals
and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business. ... "
276 Cf., Am. Law Inst., Federal Income Tax Statute, Draft No. 6, § X150, X152, suggesting
abandonment of the "ordinary and necessary" concept.
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ment qualifying as a charitable contribution under section 23(q) is disqualified
from any further consideration as a business expense deduction. This provision under section 162(b) of the proposed Code is now extended to embrace individuals.2 77 The committee report indicates that "no substantive change is made
in the application of this rule".2 78
PART V
TAX POLICY TOWARD EDUCATION-TWO PROPOSALS
Long before the excitement engendered by the proposed 1954 Internal Revenue Code has died down, 279 the mundane task of amending it will have commenced. Adjusting tax legislation to a complex and dynamic economic structure
will always be a never-ending task. In this process, experience seems to indicate
that most improvements of lasting worth as may result from the legislative process
will be, however labeled, patchwork. Of necessity then, attention must be centered on economic groups and institutions. Only when clear cut policy toward such
bodies has been established can they be properly integrated into the whole tax
structure.
The foregoing study, including the proposed Code changes, hardly reveals a
dear cut, comprehensive tax policy toward private education. It does reveal, however, a number of irritants. To two of these the balance of this study is devoted with
the suggestion that satisfactory solutions will be a step forward in working out
a definite and workable tax policy toward private education. These two irritants or
problems may be characterized as: (1) the problem of the propaganda organization; and (2) the problem of individual deductions for educational purposes.
The Problem of the PropagandaOrganization.
The problem of the propaganda organization is primarily the problem of
the public dissemination organization claiming and receiving educational status.
The question then might be whether or not there is any evidence that these doctrinal groups have or are engaged in activities inconsistent with their preferred
status as educational organizations, activities that are abusive or unfair. Of course,
what is abusive and unfair is but a question of degree and but broadly reflects current tax morality. But Congress, in reflecting this current tax morality, treats education-not doctrine-preferentially. The underlying theory is that private education is performing a function that would otherwise be performed by government in the interest of all the people. Therefore, unless doctrine (propaganda)
and education are synonomous as used in this context, the focus is and should be
on the meaning of the term "education", not upon the principle of freedom of
speech.
Sec... 162(b) provides: "No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) (supra n.275)
for any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction under section 170 were it not
for the percentage limitations, or the requirement as to the time of payment, set forth in such section."
278 4 P-H Tax Ser.,
66,000.140 (1954).
27t
Say, in two or three hundred years.
2.7
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Tested abstractly by the meaning of the term "education" the question then
is whether the doctrinal group qualifies. In so far as objectivity is associated with
education, the doctrinal group does not qualify. However, in the broad sense, the
individual's assimilation of doctrine (propaganda) is educational, and in the realities of rule making, the courts have accepted this, inconsistent as it may be with
basic theory and popular conception. To this extent, education and doctrine are
not distinguishable. John Harvard, Karl Marx, Henry George, and H. L. Hunt
lie in the same tax bed. In so far as they have a doctrine, however, we have drawn
the line when any of them take active steps to induce the legislature to impose their
doctrine on others. We have also drawn the line at a second place. Doctrine based
on a use of force and violence is likewise disqualified as educational. 280 This is
commanded by an overriding policy of public safety. Now, the recent investigation
of Facts Forum, as outlined in the second part of this study, 28 1 raises the question
28 2
as to whether the line should not also be drawn at still a third place.
Facts Forum is represented as a public dissemination organization commanding a large audience. It pursues a variety of mass communication methods. These
include the Facts Forum News with a circulation of 60,000, television programs, a
public opinion poll and a "both sides" radio program, its principal technique and
medium, carried coast-to-coast over some 222 stations, largely on free time.
In the basic investigation of Facts Forum conducted by reporter Bagdikian, it
is revealed that the organization qualifies under section 101 (6) and 23(o) (2)
as an educational organization. The principal tax benefits under the latter section
seem to flow to the organization's "angel", H. L. Hunt, of Dallas, Texas. Mr.
Hunt is represented to be one of the richest men in America with an estimated gross
income of $200,000 daily.2 83 Mr. Bagdikian also writes:
"Facts Forum has 'existed for 30 months. During the first-and
relatively quiet-half of its life Facts Forum spent about $200,000 of
tax-free dollars, and the Hunts gave Facts Forum $219,000 tax-free dollars. Facts Forum will not say what its current budget is. But in the second 15 months of its operations it has expended enormously. It has added at least four regional offices with paid organizers (one in Hunt's birthplace, Vandalia, Ill.), and entered network radio and television activities on a coast-to-coast scale. So there is reason to believe that the $200,000 expenditures of the early months of Facts Forum is only a fraction
of the current budget. In those early months,2 8the Hunts supplied more
than 95 per cent of the listed contributions. " 4
Sec. ii of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 996, 50 U.S.C. 790, disallows deductions
to, and denies exemption of, communist controlled organizations. See also reg. 118, § 39. 101-2.
281 Supra n.105.
282 Bagdikian, "The Facts About Facts Forum", reprint from The Providence Journal-Bulletin,
Dec.-Jan., 1953-54, hereinafter referred to as Bagdikian. See also "McCarthy, Hunt, and Facts
Forum", 10 The Reporter No. 4, p. 19 (February 16, 1954), an excerption from the principal
eight part series.
288 Ibid. at p. 2.
284 Ibid. at p. 3.
280
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One of the principal announced purposes of Facts Forum is that of combating
communism. Under this banner, however, reporter Bagdikian concludes that it
advances a political philosophy or doctrine of its own using a variety of techniques
in the field of mass communications. In the concluding part of his eight part series,
reporter Bagdikian summarizes the criticisms that have been leveled at Facts Forum.
The first eight he classifies as minor, the ninth as a major danger from this educational organization :285
"1. Facts Forum's presentation of 'both sides' of national issues for
purposes of educating the voter appears to be heavily2 86biased on the side
of isolationism, ultraconservatism and McCarthyism.
2. Facts Forum uses its powerful facilities of free radio time and the
60,000 circulation of its News, plus news releases to newspapers, radio
stations and every member of Congress, to express the personal political
philosophy
of H. L. Hunt and the chief Facts Forum moderator, Dan
287
Smoot.

3. (Despite the Code stricture against propaganda organizations)
facilities of Facts Forum are used to conduct a 'public opinion
poll' which it admits is not a cross-section poll but merely a d'evice to
*

. .,the

Ibid. at pp. 21-23.
One example of a Facts Forum "both sides" program that Mr. Bagdikian reports as being
typical of the slanted doctrinal approach was its presentation of "both sides" of the question:
"Should we continue to handle Korea as a limited police action?" Mr. Bagdikian states: "The
first part of the program was devoted to the arguments of those who favor American intervention
in Korea. It ouoted the schoolish terms of Gen. Omar Bradley and the relatively unemotional
words of Adlai Stevenson. 'Korea', it quoted Stevenson, 'is the most remarkable effort the world
hqs ever seen to make collective security work. In choosing to repel the first armed aggression of
the Communists, we chose to make bitter sacrifices today to save civilization tomorrow. . .' Thus
went in style and tempo the argument for handling Korea as a police action. "Then came, as Facts
Forum put it, 'the other side': " 'It is a strange war for a man who has been taught to love the
American flag but who now finds himself fighting under a blue flag representing a world organization of which his enemy, the Soviet, is a member. " 'He is in a Korean foxhole as the result
of a United Nations order, but our Constitution says that only Congress can declare war. It's called
a United Nations police action, but the United Nations' only noticeable contribution is a policy
of appeasement which keeps the Americans from winning .... - 'It's cold up here in the wintersometimes 30 below zero. If a boy cries his tears turn to ice. And then there is the enemy, always
the enemy. Joe can feel him out there in the blackness, and sometimes he can hear him. And sometimes when a star shell bursts overhead, he can see him-not one, but thousands, moving relentlessly forward. . . . Presently, the third assault wave starts, and then the noise-the screaming,
eerie unearthly noise of mindless men in a banzai charge. And a boy from Texas starts firing as
fast as be can feed clips into his automatic weapon. He fires until the gun is red hot in his hand1s.
The Commies die. They die by the hundreds, and fall in heaps; but there are endless numbers of
them. For every one that falls, ten come up to charge over his dead body; and some of them get
through--one, ten, or a thousand. Then it is the kind of fight that man fought centuries ago;
knives and fists, fingers groping for eyes, and teeth seeking a soft spot in the neck. Maybe Joe will
die in the slit trench, and maybe he will live--his hands sour and gummy with half-digested rice
gruel ripped out of the stomach of a bleeding bundle of rags and bones at his feet. ..Korea. Police
action or war? A question for all Americans. This is Dan Smoot for Facts Forum.' " Ibid at pp. 5-6.
287 Of Hunt, Mr. Bagdikian says: "Politically, Hunt is not noisy. Like his friend, novelist Louis
Bromfield, he hates the New Deal and the Fair Deal. . . . He feels that the Democratic Party,
except for the Dixiecrat movement, is the instrument of socialism and Communism in this country,
and that the Republican Party, as presently constituted displays dangerously radical tendencies."
Ibid. at p. 2. Mr. Bagdikian also states, "In a rare speech in 1951, H. L. Hunt described what
he believed would be a struggle to the death in this country between two schools of thought-the
far right and the far left. The moderate, or 'middle-of-the-roaders' as he called them, would amount
to nothing." Ibid. at p. 11.
285
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'exert a powerful psychological force' which is then applied through
news releases288and membership pressure on organs of public opinion and
on Congress.
4. Despite this same rule, the funds of Facts Forum are used to subsidize expressions in newspapers which are ostensibly merely individual
opinions but for which Facts Forum pays, with a 9-to-1 preponderance
of the rewards going to those expressing isolationist, ultra-conservative
and McCarthyist views.
5. The activities of Facts Forum have attracted known race-hate
agitators who have led and addressed local Facts Forum meetings. 28 9
The works of known religious
agitators have been distributed by Facts
Forum as 'voter education'. 290
6. (Despite the Code enurement clause). . .Facts Forum has used
its public relations machinery for the unusual promotion of the company
of one of its national officers, Gen. Robert E. Wood ....Sears, Roebuck
has used the commercial facilities of its organization to distribute the
literature of Facts Forum, notably in Washington, D.C., but also in other
localities.291
288 Mr. Bagdikian says, "Each month Facts Forum mails out 120,000 postcards with poll questions on them. It says it gets about 12,000 back. All signed cards are counted in the poll. Facts Forum
suggests that members fill out the cards together at their meetings. "The results are then incorporated
into a news release which goes to 1,800 newspapers all over the country, 500 radio stations and to
all members of Congress. The news release refers to it only as a 'public opinion poll'. However.
in its own publication, the Facts Forum News, it is described not as a cross-section poll-which
most editors, radio newsmen and Congressmen would assume a 'public opinion poll' to be-but
a poll of 'informed' (that is, Facts Forum membership) opinion. Ibid. at p. 15. Some of the questions, requiring either a "yes" or "no" answer, not only require the illogical acceptance of two
major premises, but also contain highly emotional terms. They appear almost absurd. e.g., "Are
internationalists less tolerant of Communism than the average citizen?". .Would destruction of
Christianity from within be worst of all treason?"..."Is the inroad of Communism in Latin America
more dangerous to us than our tolerance of Communists in the United States?"..."Is Congress inadvisably abdicating its Constitutional powers?"...."Are the pink segments of the press losing
their power?"..." Can the pinks filch the word FREEDOM as they have others of fine U.S. tra.
dition?" Ibid. at p. 16.
289 Bagdikian says, "Early this year when a new Facts Forum unit was formed in the New York
City church of a national adviser to Facts Forum, Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, the first speaker to
address the group was Allen A. Zoll. Zoll attacked the United Nations as a device to permit the
colored races to rule the white races and charged that UNESCO is an alien conspiracy to teach sex
delinquency to American school children. A protest to Dr. Peale from a parishioner brought no
disapproval of Zoll but praise for Facts Forum." Ibid. at p. 12.
290 E.g. S.M.U. Professor John 0. Beatty's book, "Iron Curtin Over America" (1951), later
withdrawn by Facts Forum from its circulating library under formal protest of the Anti-Defamation
League. Ibid. at p. 12. Mr. Bagdikian says, "The highly respected Protestant magazine Zions
Herald, has this to say of the author and this book: 'Beatty is a recent "intellectual" addition to
the lengthening list of outspoken bigots across the country, and his volume appears to be the most
extensive piece of racist propaganda in the history of the anti-Semitic movement in America.' "
Ibid. A recent review of the same book by "a group of S.M.U. law professors ... denounced it as
a collection of 'spurious doctrines and bigoted theories of racial and religious prejudice.' " 63
Time No. 15 (April 12, 1954), p.57.
291 Bagdikian says, "A page one article of the Facts Forum News, a tax-free publication sent
to 60,000 persons including all members of Congress, declared in part, 'It is very appropriate that
Sears, Roebuck should be sponsoring Facts Forum. For Sears, Roebuck and its mail order business
is as American as the town hall meeting itself'. 'Since Sears, Roebuck is helping us in our fight to
overcome apathy and indifference, it might behoove us to express our appreciation and friendship
for Sears whenever possible.' " Ibid. at p.22.
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7. There has been participation by associates of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy in the planning and operations of Facts Forum which surpasses
the realm of coincidence. Senator McCarthy also has been the beneficiary
of unusual treatment in the basic programs of Facts Forum.
8. The grass roots operations of Facts Forum have often exhibited a
spirit which is the opposite of free debate in good faith .... 292
9. But, the major criticism that can be made of Facts Forum is that
its net effect is to disseminate fear, suspicion and divisive propaganda.
The consistent pattern of its 'both sides' broadcasts is to reduce all
national issues to isolationism, ultra-conservatism and McCarthyismversus-treason or stupidity.
The results of this, if carried into the entire field of mass communications, could be to increase the pressures dividing segments of American
society, to increase group hatreds, and to implant suspicions which did
(footnotes supplied)
not exist before ....
To this impressive list of criticisms might be added a tenth and that is a
tendency to increase in the popular mind a distrust of the tax policy that accords
the educational organization a preferred place in the federal income tax structure.
This could be a serious threat to private education dependent as it is upon private
beneficence. Measured by any popular conception of the proper functioning of
an educational organization, the Facts Forum type of organization is little more
than an educational masquerade. To contend that Facts Forum is performing a
quasi-governmental service in disseminating the personal philosophy and doctrine
of H. L. Hunt and Facts Forum seems incredulous.
There are two possible approaches to meet this threat to sound tax policy: (1)
administrative and judicial reappraisal of the established test of legislative activity
as indicative of the propaganda organization; or (2) congressional redefinition
by amendment to the Code.
Judicial Reappraisal. Reporter Bagdikian suggests that Facts Forum violates
the enurement dause in the Code, in its promotion of Sears, Roebuck and Com292 Bagdikian says, "In Dallas a few months ago, the YMCA-YWCA at Southern Methodist
University held an open debate on the subject: "UNESCO Under Fire". From a pro-United Nations organization it obtained a speaker to defend UNESCO. The students applied to the headquarters of Facts Forum for an anti-United Nations speaker and Facts Forum supplied one. The
results of this student meeting were commented upon by an editorial in the student newspaper,
"The S.M.U. Campus". Speaking of supporters who accompanied the Facts Forum speaker, the
editorial declared, " 'Using fascist tactics, a group of adults invaded and gained control of the
meeting. . .Before the debate started, around 30 adults entered the meeting, and scattered themselves through the audience. They tried to twist opinion to their side by loud applause of their
speaker and in some cases by laughing at the opposing speaker. They monopolized the question
and answer period, reading from material they brought, made character assassinations, and used
guilt by association as their most powerful weapon. Although the meeting was not closed to outsiders, the members of the 'Y' were surprised that the organization asked to furnish one of the
speakers had also supplied an audience and some additional speakers. As the question and answer
period became more heated a young woman who had been sitting on the front row jumped up and
viciously attacked one of the speakers. The 'Y' members who had gathered for Christian fellowship
and information about an important topic were a bit shocked. The sentiments of the audience were
best expressed the next day by a student who before the discussion had taken no side in the matter:
"I couldn't sleep last night for thinking I had been in a meeting of the German-American Bund..
Ibid.
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pany. However, what he offers would probably be insufficient to satisfy a court,
under existing doctrine, that anything but an incidental benefit is enuring to the
benefit of a private person. 293 This leaves for consideration the suggestion, as outlined in his third and fourth criticisms above, that its "public opinion poll" and
its subsidies of "letters to the editor" constitute legislative activity.
Reporter Bagdikian suggests that the actual handling of the Facts Forum
"public opinion poll" may constitute legislative activity. He states that in Facts
Forum's own literature it is admitted to be not a poll at all. He quotes Facts Forum:
" 'The purpose of the poll is to focus the attention of large numbers of people in all walks of life and in all parts of the nation on a carefully selected group of important questions. 294 By thus causing thousands
of people to consider the same group of questions at the same time, the
poll may be invoking a powerful psychological force for good.' "295
(footnotes supplied)
Mr. Bagdikian then states that Facts Forum instructs its members in the Facts
Forum News:
"'Call your newspaper for poll results... ask your friends to write
Call the results of Facts Forum
letters to the editor on poll questions ....
polls to the attention of public officials. They will pay more attention
Write your memto them as they appear in the Congressional Record ....
bers of Congress th'e results of poll questions you wish them to remember. . . .Explain to friends that when they vote a poll card it takes the
place in some measure of writing every member of Congress a letter.' "296
This "public opinion poll" is stated by Mr. Bagdikian to be closely allied to
Facts Forum's "letters to the editor" payments. The letters sent to various newspapers are on subjects current in the poll. Mr. Bagdikian's analysis of 193 letters
for which Facts Forum paid, after eliminating about twelve per cent on non-political
subjects, indicated payment of $3,630 "for isolationists, or anti-United Nations,
or pro-McCarthy, or uncontrolled-economy views, and $439 for opposing
views".

2 97

The key statutory words, unchanged in the proposed Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, that would eliminate Facts Forum and similar organizations from the
educational category, are whether or not the organization is "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation". The courts, it has been
pointed out,298 have tested such an organization's status by the degree of legislative
activity in which it has engaged. In so doing, they seem to be influenced by whether
or not the organization has a legislative program.29 9 Do these activities of Facts
Forum constitute a legislative program? This is perhaps debatable. However, it
293
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Supra n.291.
For the type of "carefully selected" question see supra n. 288.
Bagdikian at p.16.
Ibid. at p. 17.

Ibid. at p. 15.
58 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 189 at 197-200.
E.g. supra n. 95.
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should be pointed out that should Facts Forum actively support the political candidacy of any person or actively lobby for particular legislation, their status as an
educational organization would be lost. Can they thus do indirectly what they are
prohibited from doing directly? Again it is perhaps debatable.
A bold court might take a new look at what constitutes influencing legislation
and hold that taking the whole Facts Forum program into consideration, there
would be sufficient evidence of "otherwise attempting, to influence legislation".
However, boldness can not be anticipated in an area commonly associated with
extreme judicial liberality. Reality would seem to demand that reform must depend upon Congress.
Congressional Definition of the PropagandaOrganization. It is difficult to
charge either the coufts or Congress with delinquency in the matter of control of
such masquerading educational organizations as Facts Forum, that is, up to this
time. Nothing in the history of the income tax seems comparable to the Facts Forum
situation with its millions of dollars of free radio and television time. s00 However,
it is suggested, that the time is now ripe for reappraisal.
Several methods could be pursued in amending the Code. One might be to
simply add the term "directly or indirectly" after the term "attempting". Thus
the appropriate sections would deny educational status where the organization is
"carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, directly or indirectly, to influence legislation". In other words, where there is a substantial amount of propaganda activity it would be a matter for the courts to determine whether in a given
case the object was to influence legislation "directly or indirectly".
Such a provision would have the advantage of informing the courts that the
simple legislative program test would not suffice for all cases. However, it would
have a decided disadvantage in establishing a standard of such generality as to
be valueless from the standpoint of predictability until after years of ruling and
litigation.
A second method might be to re-cast the language of the various sections, denying educational status to a "propaganda organization", and defining such an
organization as one presenting controversial matter in other than an objective
manner. In such case it might be desirable to limit the application of such a defined organization to organizations other than educational institutions now defined for purposes of the special rule of section 170 of the 1954 Code and the
prohibited transactions provisions.
The result of such an approach would be to cast upon the courts the task of
determining what matter is controversial and whether it was objectively presented. This would hardly be an indelicate problem. However, it would seem to offer
more hope for predictability than the previous suggestion. Also, it should offer
the public dissemination organization truly dedicated to public education no cause
Mr. Bagdikian makes several references to "over a million dollars annually", and The Reporter, supra n. 282, estimates $5 million dollars annually.
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for alarm. And of overriding importance, it would establish a rule that comports
with popular concept and with basic tax policy that gives the educational organization its preferred status because it performs what would otherwise be a governmental function.
The Problem of Individual Deductions For Educational Purposes.
The plea for the second reform, wholly unrelated to the first, rests largely
upon what has been suggested to be a muddled state of the law dealing with individual deductions for educational expenditures.
The necessity for clarification seems evident. The tax concepts of personal,
capital and business expenses have not served well in this area. The Treasury attempts to hold the line to treatment as personal expense, until recently, it is true,
have lent some degree of stability to the problem. But the Hill decision and its
acceptance by the Treasury, followed by the Coughlin case, suggests now that a
policy clarification is needed. The shadowy line between the compulsion required
by the Treasury in its acceptance of the Hill decision wavering over into the moral
complusion of taxpayer Coughlin and stopping at the point where a teacher, for
example, continues to invest in additional training in discharge of a moral obligation to keep informed or merely to broaden his base of knowledge, is too nebulous on which to justify difference in tax treatment and predict tax liability.
A new approach is needed.
The Treasury. The Treasury has yet to indicate its reaction to the Coughlin
case. It should be forthcoming. However, even acceptance is apt to be limited. It
is unlikely that the Treasury will recognize a moral duty upon the part of all professional people as the basis of an ordinary and necessary business expense. This
means a continuation of the discrimination between taxpayers in substantially
similar positions.
The Courts. The question heme may be simply whether it can be anticipated
that the courts will widen the breach established by the Hill and Coughlin cases.
This is highly debatable. The Tax Court has already clearly indicated that it is unwilling to expand on the Hill cas'e. It has fairly intimated its distaste for this type
of a deduction. Until this all important tribunal is won over, no great progress
can be expected.
The courts as a whole can not be charged with misdirection of congressional
policy in an area where Congress itself has been largely silent. The long continued
administrative view, of which it can not be assumed Congress was ignorant, does
not justify wholesale judicial expansion of the Hill and Coughlin cases. The best
that can be expected is continued litigation and the usual long process of judicial
refinement based on prevailing tax concepts. Tax equity, therefore, can not be
expected to exert an overriding influence.
Congress. Tax equity demands that deductions be justified. Is there justification for according a deduction for educational expenditures? Approaching the
problem from the viewpoint of the basic tax concepts here involved, it might be
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suggested that Congress provide the criteria for distinguishing between capital,
personal and business expenditures. Would this be desirable? A measure of clarity
might be afforded, yet, it would seem that the criteria would have to be in some
detail both as to the groups to be covered, and the types of expenditures embraced
under each group. Such an approach, it is suggested, is not desirable either from
the standpoint of predictability or tax equity.
A second approach, and one that would seem to be more desirable, would be to
abandon the basic concepts in the interest of the end result. For example, starting
with the basic premise that all such expenditures are non-deductible whether they
might be considered ordinary and necessary business expenses or not, Congress
might grant a limited educational deduction to all individual taxpayers. Such a provision would be applicable independent of any relationship to a trade or business.
It might be desirable to limit the total annual deduction to, say ten per cent of adjusted gross income, or $500 whichever is the lower. It would be desirable to define "educational expenses" for the purpose of this deduction. However, limiting
such expenditures to those incurred in attending educational institutions as defined for purposes of the new special rule would not be desirable in this case. But,
limitations would still have to be made. The provision should be framed to embrace such expenditures as the costs of summer schooling, institute and refresher
course attendance, correspondence courses and night school training.
There is ample precedent for the handling of personal expenses on such
a basis. For example, section 23 (x) of the Code allows a deduction for extraordinary medical expenses. The underlying theory for such an allowance is recognition
of hardship in situations where such extraordinary expenses are incurred. On what
basis would a similar educational expense be justified? There are a number of considerations that would commend such treatment.
In the first place, it would treat all taxpayers desiring to avail themselves of
it, equally. This is hardly a small consideration in itself. Of course, it is arguable
that it would discriminate against the taxpayer who does not desire to improve
himself under the statutory terms. This, however, can hardly be characterized as inequitable where freedom of choice exists. All that can be possibly expected in the
name of tax equity is that taxpayers similarly situated are treated equally for tax
purposes.
In the second place, it might offer a larger measure of certainty in a fairly
muddled area. Of course, the criteria 'established might well result in some initial
confusion, but this is largely a matter of draftsmanship and clarity in expression
of policy. Much more difficult matter has been successfully codified.
Finally, and what seems to be the overriding consideration, is the encouragement it would offer the individual taxpayer in undertaking formal training. This,
of course, would be expressive of long range tax policy toward education and
would be a complement to congressional policy as regards educational institutions,
their donors and the recipients of scholarships and fellowships.
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What would be the objections to the allowance of such a deduction? Aside
from the loss to the revenue, which would seem to be small, the principle objection
would seem to be that the income tax structure is being used to further a non-tax
policy. This, of course, is not a minor criticism. Some highly respectable thinking
would limit the income tax structure purely to the matter of raising revenue equitably. It is argued that this task is difficult enough without saddling the structure
with the carrying out of non-tax policies and that the fact that the income tax
structure is so used, for example, in subsidizing foreign commerce and the exploration of gas and oil, is no reason that it should be so used.8 01 On the other
hand, there is also respectable thinking that the income tax structure should be used
in the interests of the whole community when its interest so dictates. For Lxample,
it is often suggested that the exemption and dependency provisions afford a convenient vehicle to control business activity and to contract or increase consumer
buying.
Perhaps the answer to such an argument on policy as concerns the Code amendment here suggested is that in a large measure the proposal is a clarification of
existing law and that in as much as some educational expenses are now allowed as
business expenses, it is a compromise in the interests of tax equity and predictability.
Conclusions
The adoption of these two proposals by Congress, it is submitted, would go
a long way toward the clarification and complementation of a sound income tax
policy toward private education.
With regard to the first proposal, the unchecked and uncontrolled propaganda
organization masquerading as an educational organization represents a serious
threat to taxpayer morale and the necessary financial support needed by private
educational institutions. Such practices as evidenced by the activities of FactsForum,
for example, are so contrary to the policies underlying the deduction and exemption
privileges that their elimination as educational activities should be forthcoming.
With regard to the second proposal, Congress, the courts and even the Treasury
have exhibited an extreme kindliness toward both the educational institution and
its benefactors. In the further interest of long range policy, some consideration for
the individual in his efforts to provide educational training for himself would
seem to be in order. This does not seem to be expecting too much in light of the
ben'efits that flow to the whole community from an informed citizenry.

See e.g. exchange of correspondence on the policy of subsidizing oil and gas exploration between Dean Griswold, Harvard Law School, and Rex Baker, Esq., General Counsel, Humble Oil
Co., Houston, Texas, in "Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence", 64 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1951).
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